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Years from now, when we look back at the history of mass tort
litigation, it will not surprise me if we are able to speak sensibly of mass
torts as being either pre-tobacco or post-tobacco. The current wave of
tobacco litigation marks an important period in the development of mass
torts, particularly regarding the balance of power between plaintiffs and
defendants.
The tobacco litigation has established, above all, that the
systematic defendant advantage in mass tort litigation is dead. The
tobacco mass tort litigation is both the strongest proof of the demise of the
defendant advantage, and a contributing cause of that demise. The death
of the defendant advantage results largely from four developments. First,
the financial resources of the elite plaintiffs' bar have reached a point
where plaintiffs' lawyers can fund large-scale litigation at the highest
level. Second, coordination among plaintiffs' lawyers has developed so
that it rivals or exceeds strategic organization and information-sharing on
the defense side. Third, state attorneys general and other government
actors have entered the mass tort fray on the plaintiffs' side. Fourth,
plaintiffs' lawyers have found ways to pursue mass tort class actions,
despite a long reluctance by courts to certify them and a string of appellate
decisions in the 1990s that appeared to squelch any remaining hope for
class actions in mass toxic exposure cases.
All four of these developments figured prominently in the
emergence of tobacco claims as viable mass tort litigation after decades of
industry invincibility. The first important signs of the shift came in 1994,
although several more years would pass before any plaintiff successes
were registered. It was 1994 when leading plaintiffs' lawyers began in
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earnest to coordinate their efforts and pool their substantial resources to
take on the tobacco defendants.' It was also 1994 when the state attorneys
general began filing actions against cigarette makers to recoup money
spent treating tobacco-related illnesses.2 This new wave of tobacco
litigation demonstrated that plaintiffs' lawyers were able to coordinate
their efforts to rival the concentration of power on the defense side. It also
demonstrated that a segment of the plaintiff bar had accumulated the
resources to pursue and sustain massive litigation at the highest level. It
showed, as well, that under the right circumstances government lawsuits
can shift the balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants. In
combination with new evidence from corporate insiders, 3 these features
were responsible for the turnaround in the tobacco litigation. These
developments were so interdependent and so intertwined with a shift in
public attitudes toward smoking that it can be hard to distinguish causes
and effects. Without these developments, however, and especially the
elimination of the systematic defendant advantage, it is difficult to
imagine the tobacco settlements and verdicts of the past several years.
II. DAVID AND GOLIATH
The traditional model of personal injury tort litigation against
corporate defendants looks like this: individual plaintiffs represented by
solo or small-firm lawyers with limited resources versus giant corporate
defendants represented by major national law firms. It is a model that has
woven its way into our national consciousness and popular culture. Think
of Jan Schlichtmann driving his tiny firm into financial ruin representing
the plaintiffs in the Woburn contaminated water litigation against the
forces of Hale & Doff and Foley, Hoag & Eliot, and their Fortune 500
clients, in Jonathan Harr's non-fiction bestseller, A Civil Action.4 In
fiction, think of John Grisham's The Rainmaker, in which young lawyer
Rudy Baylor fights for his dying client against the Great Benefit Insurance
I On the lawyer consortium that pooled its resources to bring the Castano nationwide
class action, see infra text accompanying notes 37-40.2 On the government recoupment lawsuits, see infra text accompanying notes 48-71.
3 Most notably, whistleblower tobacco scientist Jeffrey Wigand and paralegal Merrell
Williams exposed critical information and documents concerning the tobacco industry's
knowledge of the dangers and addictiveness of cigarettes. See PETER PRINGLE,
CORNERED: BIG TOBACCO AT THE BAR OF JUSTICE 56-71, 177-93 (1998); DAN ZEGART,
CIVIL WARRIORS: THE LEGAL SIEGE ON THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY 77-81, 129-33, 181-93
12000).
JONATHAN HAAR, A CIVIL ACTION (First Vintage Books 1996).
[Vol. 26:123
THE END OF THE DEFENDANT ADVANTAGE
Company's legal team.5 In film, picture Paul Newman in David Mamet's
The Verdict, scrappily representing his injured client against a hospital and
its imposing law firm.6
The image the traditional litigation model brings to mind, more
than any other, is the biblical story of young David facing the Philistine
giant, Goliath of Gath.7  Goliath stood six cubits and a span. His
spearhead weighed 600 shekels of iron.9 At the sound of Goliath's voice,
the armies of Israel "were dismayed and greatly afraid."' 0  Countless
plaintiffs and their lawyers have felt similar dismay when squaring off
against six-cubit corporate defendants represented by 600-shekel law
firms. The David-and-Goliath model not only applies to individual
litigation, but also applied to much mass tort litigation until the last decade
or two, as evidenced most clearly by the tobacco litigation. Even if there
were many similarly situated plaintiffs, each of those plaintiffs faced a
massive defendant in a litigation mismatch, and like the Israelite armies,
each felt outsized by the giant.
The defendant's litigation advantage, in this traditional model, is
threefold: resources, information, and organization. Large corporate
defendants have the resources to fund litigation at the highest level, and to
hire lawyers who, in turn, have the resources and experience to litigate at
the highest level. Not only does this give defendants the advantage that
comes from top-quality legal work, but more troublingly, it can allow
defendants to outspend and outlast plaintiffs in a litigation war of attrition.
In addition to greater resources, defendants generally have an information
advantage. Defendants often possess information essential to proving
liability, and it is each plaintiffs struggle to get that information.
Moreover, a single defendant has information about the full scope of the
litigation, whereas plaintiffs may be ignorant of what is happening in cases
other than their own. Finally, defendants have the organizational
advantage of being able to implement a coherent strategy, either as a
single defendant or as a relatively small group engaged in a joint defense,
in contrast to plaintiffs represented by multitudes of competing
independent lawyers.
5 JOHN GRISHAM, THE RAINMAKER (1995).
6 THE VERDICT (Twentieth Century Fox 1982).
7 See I Samuel 17:1-58.
8 Id. at 17:4.
9 Id. at 17:7.
10 Id. at 17:11.
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Of course, a defendant advantage does not guarantee a defendant
victory. Plenty of individual and mass tort plaintiffs have succeeded in
their claims against large corporate defendants, despite the defendants'
litigation advantage. Indeed, some mass tort defendants have been
bankrupted by mass tort claims." Even young David, after all, defeated
Goliath with a well-aimed slingshot.12  But a party with superior
resources, information, and organization has a systematic advantage in
litigation. In tort litigation--or more precisely, in settlement negotiations
that occur in the shadow of tort litigation-an advantageous litigation
position is what matters most.
For forty years, from 1954"s to 1994,14 the tobacco litigation
provided the perfect example of David and Goliath litigation. Plaintiff
after plaintiff was crushed by the tobacco defendants. Hundreds of claims
were filed during those decades. The vast majority of the claims were
dismissed before trial. Of those that went to trial, nearly all of the cases
were won by defendants. The rare plaintiffs' verdicts were reversed on
appeal. Author Peter Pringle summed up well the tobacco defendants'
record during this period: "Eight hundred and thirteen claims filed against
the industry, twenty-three tried in court, two lost, both overturned on
appeal. Not a penny paid in damages."'
15
An important part of the tobacco defendants' strategy during this
period was to encourage voluntary dismissals by plaintiffs by making
litigation so burdensome and expensive that many plaintiffs and their
lawyers chose to drop their claims rather than pursue them to trial. In a
now-infamous 1988 internal memo, one R.J. Reynolds defense lawyer
wrote:
I I The asbestos litigation alone has driven twenty-six major companies into bankruptcy.
See Queena Sook Kim, Asbestos Claims Continue to Mount, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2001,
at B1; Queena Sook Kim, Firms Hit by Asbestos Litigation Take Bankruptcy Route,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2000, at B4.
12 See 1 Samuel 17:49-51.
13 In 1954, the first products liability lawsuit was filed against a tobacco company for
illness attributed to cigarettes. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CLEARING THE SMOKE:
ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE FOR TOBACCO HARM REDUCTION 595 app. c (Kathleen
Stratton et al. eds., 2001), available at http://books.nap.edu/books/0309072824/html/
95.html#pagetop (last visited Nov. 20, 2001).
14In 1994, two critical events signaled a turnaround in the tobacco mass tort litigation.
In March, a major consortium of leading plaintiffs' lawyers filed the Castano nationwide
tobacco class action in federal court in Louisiana. In May, Mississippi filed the first of
the state attorney general lawsuits against the tobacco industry. See Emily Barker,
Tobacco Litigation: Guide to the Players, AM. LAW., Mar. 1996, at 108-109, 116.
15 PRINGLE, supra note 3, at 7.
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[T]he aggressive posture we have taken regarding
depositions and discovery in general continues to make
these cases extremely burdensome and expensive for
plaintiffs' lawyers, particularly sole practitioners. To
paraphrase General Patton, the way we won these cases
was not by spending all of [R.J. Reynolds'] money, but by
making that other son of a bitch spend all of his.16
The strategy worked. Tobacco plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed numerous
claims during those forty years, and given the expense of pursuing the
claims, and the low odds of success, it is difficult to call their decisions
irrational.
In recent years, however, the defendant advantage has largely
disappeared. Prior to 1994, the outlook for tobacco plaintiffs was bleak:
no class actions were certified and every individual plaintiff lost. But just
a few years later, the dynamics had changed entirely, as had the results. In
1997, a second-hand smoke class action of flight attendants 17 resulted in a
$349 million settlement. 18 In 1997-98, the tobacco defendants agreed to
pay over $240 billion to settle the claims of the state attorneys general. 19
In 2000, a Florida statewide tobacco class action2 ° went to jury trial and
resulted in a punitive damages verdict of $145 billion, the largest
monetary verdict in history.2 1 Several individual smokers have won jury
verdicts, including one verdict in June 2001 awarding $3 billion in
punitive damages. 22  Earlier in 2001, an individual plaintiff was paid
16 Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414, 421 (D.N.J. 1993) (quoting 1988
memorandum by attorney J. Michael Jordan).
17Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
18 See Ramos v. Philip Morris Cos., 743 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
19 See Tobacco Control Res. Ctr., Inc., The Multistate Master Settlement Agreement and
the Future of State and Local Tobacco Control: An Analysis of Selected Topics and
Provisions of the Multistate Master Settlement Agreement of November 23, 1998, at
http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/msa/index.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2001).
20 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
21 See Rick Bragg, Tobacco Lawsuit in Florida Yields Record Damages, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 2000, at Al.
22 See Gordon Fairclough, Philip Morris Is Hit With $3 Billion Verdict, WALL ST. J.,
June 7, 2001, at A3 (reporting verdict of $5.5 million in compensatory damages and $3
billion in punitive damages, in Boeken v. Philip Morris).
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$1,087,191 by Brown and Williamson, the first time a tobacco company
had actually paid damages to a smoker pursuant to a verdict.23
Tobacco plaintiffs are bound to face setbacks. Some of the recent
verdicts undoubtedly will be reduced or reversed on post-trial motions or
appeal,24 and commentators debate whether the attorney general
settlements were really as unfavorable to the tobacco companies as they
first appeared.25  Cigarette makers continue to win most of the lawsuits
26brought by smokers. Nevertheless, the turnaround in the tobacco
litigation has been nothing short of remarkable. Verdicts, settlements, and
payments in the millions and billions of dollars would have been
unthinkable during the decades when the tobacco Goliaths still enjoyed the
full force of their litigation advantage.
How did it happen? To some extent, it may simply be another
story of a maturing mass tort, shifting from an extended phase of defense
dominance to a transitional phase of occasional plaintiff victories.27 Or
perhaps it is a narrower story of a particular litigation turnaround based on
new evidence from corporate whistleblowers. But I think the main story
behind the tobacco litigation turnaround is neither particular to tobacco,
23 See Ron Word, Ex-Smoker Collects from Cigarette Co., Assoc. PRESS, Mar. 8, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 15178482 (reporting on payment to plaintiff Grady Carter after
Florida Supreme Court rejected Brown & Williamson's request to avoid payment
pending appeal to U.S. Supreme Court). See also Gordon Fairclough, Justices Decline to
Hear Appeal by Tobacco Maker, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2001, at B9 (reporting on U.S.
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the Grady Carter case).
24 See Gordon Fairclough, Buying "Insurance," Tobacco Firms Agree to Pay $709
Million Into Escrow Account, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2001, at A3 (reporting one analyst's
prediction that the defendants will win their Engle appeal); Fairclough, supra note 22, at
A3 (reporting analyst's prediction that Boeken punitive damage award will be reduced
substantially); Anthony Sebok, What Big Tobacco Did Wrong, FINDLAW, July 18, 2000,
at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20000718.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2002)
(arguing that the Engle verdict probably will be reversed for failure to require proof of
plaintiffs' reliance on defendants' misrepresentations); James Sterngold, A Jury Awards a
Smoker With Lung Cancer $3 Billion From Philip Morris, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2001, at
A14 (quoting analyst's prediction that Boeken verdict will not stand).
25 See Ian Ayres, Using Tort Settlements to Cartelize, 34 VAL. U. L. REv. 595 (2000)
(arguing that the attorney general settlements create barriers to entry and allow the
tobacco companies to charge monopoly-like prices); see also Tobacco Control Res. Ctr.,
Inc., Conflict of Interest for States?, at http://www. tobacco.neu.edu (last visited Nov. 20,
2001) ("One of the major criticisms of the settlements between the states and tobacco
companies in 1997 and 1998 has been that these settlement agreements tie states'
revenues to tobacco sales.").
2 6 See Fairclough, supra note 22; Sterngold, supra note 24.
27 On the idea of maturation of mass torts, see Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature
Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REv. 659 (1989).
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nor simply a tale of mass tort maturation. Rather, I think the main story
behind the tobacco turnaround is the increasing power of plaintiffs'
lawyers, and the concomitant decline of the systematic defendant
advantage. The tobacco story, seen in this light, may say something
important about the future of mass tort litigation.
III. PLAINTIFFS' BAR: RESOURCES
In the early years of tobacco litigation, individual lawyers and
firms representing tobacco plaintiffs squared off against the tobacco
industry and were outgunned. Two developments within the plaintiffs'
bar altered the balance of power: the plaintiffs' bar's willingness and
ability to coordinate, which I will take up in the next section, and the
plaintiffs' bar's increasing wealth, which I will briefly address here.
As mass tort litigation became a lucrative business for plaintiffs'
lawyers, and as that field came to be dominated in the 1970s and 1980s by
a relatively small segment of the bar, that core group of plaintiffs' lawyers
and firms accumulated sufficient wealth to be able to invest substantial
resources from the last mass tort into prosecuting the next one. Fees from
Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield, and various other matters, but above all,
asbestos, filled the war chests of the mass tort plaintiffs' bar.28
Of course, not all plaintiffs' lawyers have the resources to pursue
complex, large-scale litigation. These resources are concentrated in an
elite cadre of mass tort lawyers who have taken the experience and fees
accumulated in earlier mass tort litigation and continued to invest it in
subsequent matters. Many of the same names would show up on lists of
the key players in multiple mass torts, including asbestos, DES, Dalkon
Shield, breast implants, diet drugs, and of course, tobacco. There has been
a concentration of power within the mass tort plaintiffs' bar. It makes
sense that such a concentration of power would be essential to a leveling
of the litigation playing field, as major corporate defendants already enjoy
the concentration of power that is inherent in a capitalist economy.
This concentration of economic power within the plaintiffs' bar
has been critical to the success of plaintiffs in the tobacco litigation. The
resources of the elite mass tort bar made it possible for the Castano group
28 On the growing financial resources of top plaintiffs' lawyers,' and their willingness to
invest heavily in new mass tort litigation, see PRINGLE, supra note 3, at 25-26; Adam
Cohen, Are Lawyers Running America?, TIME, July 17, 2000, at 22, 25; Claudia
MacLachlan, Plaintiffs' Bar Aims Once More at Tobacco, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 26, 1994, at
A14. On the continuing vitality of asbestos litigation and the fees it generates, see
Richard B. Schmitt, Burning Issue: How Plaintiffs' Lawyers Have Turned Asbestos into a
Court Perennial, WALL ST. I., Mar. 5, 2001, at AI.
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to collect a substantial litigation war chest to pursue a nationwide
smokers' class action,29 and allowed many of the state attorneys general to
rely on private, contingent-fee lawyers to prosecute the states' recoupment
lawsuits against the tobacco companies.
30
Not only was the mass tort bar's wealth instrumental in the success
of tobacco plaintiffs, that wealth has been magnified by the plaintiffs'
success in the tobacco cases. From the state attorney general settlements
alone, plaintiffs' lawyers stand to collect more than ten billion dollars in
fees over the next two decades. 3 1 If the Engle and Boeken verdicts stand,
they may yield billions of dollars in fees as well, and of course, additional
large verdicts or settlements may be yet to come. The tobacco litigation
has both demonstrated and reinforced the fact that mass tort litigation now
can be financed on the plaintiffs' side at a high level, just as it has always
been financed at a high level by the defense.
Interestingly, several notable tobacco victories have been achieved
on more limited budgets by lawyers outside the mass tort regulars.
Richard Boeken, the smoker who was recently awarded a three billion
dollar verdict, for example, was represented by Michael Piuze, a Los
Angeles lawyer with his own small firm.32  Piuze handled the case
reportedly on a "shoestring budget."33 However, it was the resource-
intensive path-breaking work of other lawyers that enabled Piuze to pursue
his successful "trial-in-a-box" strategy of using only a small number of
witnesses and several dozen documents unearthed during the attorney
general lawsuits.34 For the Boeken trial, Piuze relied on documents that
were unearthed and made available by the lawyers handling the attorney
general cases, and that were narrowed down by lawyers handling earlier
tobacco trials.
35
29 For a discussion of the Castano group, see infra text accompanying notes 37-40.
30 For a discussion of the role of private lawyers in the state recoupment lawsuits, see
infa text accompanying notes 64-71.
See John D. McKinnon, Bush Considers Trying to Tax Big Legal Fees, Feb. 15, 2001,
at A3. The size of the legal fees for the state tobacco lawsuits generated a fair amount of
controversy. See generally Panel Discussion, The Tobacco Litigation and Attorneys'
Fees, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2827 (1999).
32 See Milo Geyelin, California May Be Hazardous to Big Tobacco's Health, WALL ST.
J., June 8, 2001, at B1.
Id.
34 See id.
35 See id.; Harriet Chiang, Taking on Big Tobacco: Lawyers Team Up to Win Smoker
Suits, S.F. CHRON., July 1, 2001, at A4.
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IV. PLAINTIFFS' BAR: COORDINATION
Not only has the mass tort plaintiffs' bar acquired the resources to
invest in pursuing large-scale litigation at the highest level, it has also
become increasingly willing to pool those resources, to share information,
and to coordinate on strategy. There is undoubtedly some truth to the
contrasting popular images of the personal injury plaintiffs' lawyer as an
independent-minded, entrepreneurial-spirited lone wolf, and the defense
lawyer as a more establishment-oriented corporate personality. But
perhaps even lone wolves can see the benefit of hunting in packs when the
opportunity arises. By working together, plaintiffs' lawyers neutralize the
defendants' litigation advantage. Coordination by counsel addresses all
three aspects of the systematic defendant advantage: resources,
information, and organization. By pooling resources, the plaintiffs' bar
counters defendants' ability to wear down plaintiffs merely by
outspending them. By sharing information, the plaintiffs' bar reduces the
inherent information advantage defendants generally enjoy. Information-
sharing does not eliminate plaintiffs' need to obtain the information
through investigation and discovery, but it reduces plaintiffs' disadvantage
by facilitating the rapid spread of information among plaintiffs' counsel.
By coordinating on matters of strategy, the plaintiffs' bar eliminates the
disadvantage it faces against the coherent strategy of a single defendant,
and can even surpass the organizational coherence of some joint defense
groups in multi-defendant litigation. Working together, plaintiffs' counsel
informally aggregate their clients' claims, even in the absence of formal
judicial aggregation of the lawsuits.36
Coordination was critical to the turnaround in the tobacco
litigation. The Castano group, a coalition of plaintiffs' lawyers who
joined forces in 1994 to pursue a nationwide class action against the
tobacco industry, was the first tobacco litigation effort in which plaintiffs
came forward with power to match that of the defense. The lawyers, led
by Wendell Gauthier, amassed a huge litigation war chest as well as a vast
amount of legal talent and mass tort experience. The team grew to include
over sixty firms, each of which contributed at least $100,000 toward
expenses.37 The nationwide class action was certified by the district
36 For a detailed discussion of the phenomenon of informal aggregation, see Howard M.
Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination
Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DuKE L.J. 381 (2000).
37See id. at 393-94; see also Barker, supra note 14.
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court, but decertified by the Fifth Circuit 39 during a wave of appellate
rejections of mass tort class actions.40 Despite the ultimate failure of the
Castano class action, the creation of such a formidable power on the
plaintiffs' side helped shift the momentum and set the stage for the success
of the government lawsuits and individual and class suits a few years later.
The Castano group is but one example of lawyer coordination on
the plaintiffs' side in the tobacco litigation. Members of the Tobacco Trial
Lawyers Association ("TTLA"), a group headed by Florida lawyer Woody
Wilner, share information and documents to enhance their effectiveness on
behalf of tobacco plaintiffs. 41  The TTLA describes its mission as
supporting lawyers "who fight on behalf of consumers injured or killed by
tobacco."'2 Michael Piuze was helped by the TTLA on his way to
winning the three billion dollar Boeken verdict. 43  Similarly, the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America ("ATLA") sponsors a Tobacco
Litigation Group, which facilitates coordination and information-sharing
among tobacco plaintiffs' lawyers. 44 Other organizations encourage such
coordination as well, notably including Professor Richard Daynard's
Tobacco Control Resource Center and Tobacco Product Liability
Project.45
Tobacco is not the first mass tort litigation in which plaintiffs'
lawyers have coordinated their efforts. Indeed, the history of informal
aggregation in mass torts dates back at least to 1963, in the MER/29
46pharmaceutical litigation. But the combination of serious coordination
plus very substantial pooled resources, rivaling the coordination and
litigation spending power of defendants, is largely a post-asbestos
38 Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), rev'd, 84 F.3d
734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996).
39 Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996).
40 See infra text accompanying notes 73-79.
41See Milo Geyelin, Behind Giant Tobacco Verdicts, a Legal SWAT Team, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 12, 1999, at B1; Erichson, supra note 36, at 390-91.
4 See Tobacco Trial Lawyer's Assoc., at http://www.ttlaonline.com (last visited Nov. 20,
2001).
43 See Geyelin, supra note 33 ("Mr. Piuze also got help from the Tobacco Trial Lawyers
Association, a loose network of tobacco plaintiffs' lawyers who pioneered the [trial-in-a-
box] concept and have been honing tactics and exchanging information for four years.").
44 See Richard A. Daynard & Mark Gottlieb, Keys to Litigating Against Tobacco
Companies, TRIAL, Nov. 1999, at 18, 20.
45See Tobacco Control Res. Ctr., Inc., at http://www.tobacco.neu.edu (last visited Nov.
20, 2001).
46 See Erichson, supra note 36, at 392-93; Paul Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An
Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REv. 116 (1968).
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development. The current tobacco litigation is the first large-scale test of
the power of the post-asbestos mass tort plaintiffs' bar, and it has shown
that power to be formidable.
Looking to the future, there is every reason to believe that the
power of the plaintiffs' bar will continue in future mass tort litigation. The
concentration of resources is unlikely to disappear, as the business of
litigation often allows the rich to get richer. As to coordination,
experience has shown the value of teamwork in mass tort litigation.
Moreover, the institutions and processes are in place to enable mass tort
plaintiffs' lawyers to organize. Most significantly, ATLA sponsors
dozens of litigation groups, as well as an Internet-based information-
sharing network known as the ATLA Exchange. 47  Advances in
information technology, especially the Internet, have facilitated
coordination among lawyers pursuing related claims. In future mass tort
litigation, plaintiffs' lawyers will continue to enjoy the benefits of
coordination and information-sharing, as well as the resources to invest in
litigation at the highest level, just as they have benefited from those
resources and coordination in the tobacco litigation.
V. GOVERNMENT LAWSUITS
In the tobacco litigation, government lawsuits played an enormous
role not only in their own right, but also as a force in advancing private
claims. This is a familiar phenomenon in antitrust and securities litigation,
in which it is common for government civil or criminal prosecutions to
trigger the filing of private claims against the targeted defendants, 48 but
prior to tobacco, it was not a familiar phenomenon in mass torts.49
Mississippi filed the first state suit against cigarette makers in
1994, and over the next three years most of the states followed.50 The
states sought to recoup money spent treating tobacco-related illnesses. A
similar lawsuit filed by the federal government is proceeding.51 The state
government recoupment suits, rather than any individual or class lawsuit,
47 See ATLAExchange, at http://exchange.atla.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2001); Erichson,
supra note 36, at 396.
48 See Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions. Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco,
and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1 (2000).
49 See Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 355 (2000).
50See Tobacco Control Res. Ctr., Inc., supra note 19, at ch. 1.
51See United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2001).
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proved to be the real breakthrough litigation against the tobacco industry,
because the government suits had at least two advantages over the earlier
wave of private actions. First, the state governments were not outsized by
the tobacco defendants in terms of resources or power, especially when
those state attorneys general joined forces and pursued their claims
collectively. 52 Second, as a practical matter, the government suits
sidestepped the cigarette makers' favorite defense-that individual
smokers should accept personal responsibility for choosing to smoke.
53
The state lawsuits drove the defendants to the negotiating table, where
they eventually reached multi-billion dollar settlements with all of the
states.54
The government lawsuits not only resulted in sizable settlements
for the states, but they facilitated the prosecution of tobacco claims by
private plaintiffs. The state suits, especially Minnesota's, were
instrumental in spreading useful information to tobacco plaintiffs.
Minnesota established a publicly accessible document depository, and
many of the documents were made available on the Internet via a
Minnesota plaintiffs' firm website.55 Since then, those documents have
formed the foundation for the trial presentations of a number of private
tobacco plaintiffs' lawyers.56
The state suits may well have resulted in a change in public
attitudes about tobacco liability. State governments seeking
reimbursement, particularly as a group, carry a certain moral authority that
private plaintiffs lack.57 More significantly, once the defendants agreed to
52 Professor Richard Cupp makes this point well:
One of the keys to the states' success was combining their efforts.
Even when acting alone, a state seeking reimbursement for Medicare
expenditures has greater litigation resources and moral authority than is
typically present in mass tort actions initiated by private attorneys.
When large numbers of states combine to bring such actions, their
resources and moral authority are even more powerful.
Richard L. Cupp, Jr., State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits After Tobacco: Is the
Domino Effect for Lead Paint Manufacturers and Others Fair Game?, 27 PEPP. L. REV.
685,689 (2000).
53 See Erichson, supra note 48, at 10.
54 See Tobacco Control Res. Ctr., Inc., Multistate Settlement with the Tobacco Industry,
at http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/extra/multistatesettlement.htm (last visited Nov. 20,
2001).
55 See Mark Gottlieb, Finding the Smoking Guns in Tobacco Litigation, TRIAL, Nov.
1999, at 22.
56 See Erichson, supra note 48, at 11-14.
See Cupp, supra note 52, at 689.
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settle with the attorneys general, the idea of tobacco liability no longer
seemed like an impossibility.58  Moreover, given the Size of the state
attorney general tobacco settlements, jurors felt empowered to think in
terms of billions of dollars.59
When state attorneys general and other government actors enter the
mass tort fray on the side of the plaintiffs, pursuing discovery to prove
defendants' tortious conduct, they substantially erode any power
advantage of corporate defendants. Looking to future mass torts, it
appears likely that government entities will continue to file lawsuits to
recover money spent on preventing or tre ating harm caused by the tortious
conduct of corporate defendants. Such suits have been filed involving
handguns60 and lead paint,61 and others are likely to follow. 62  The
National Association of Attorneys General provides a forum for
coordination of such litigation and received a $50 million infusion for its
enforcement fund as part of the 1998 tobacco settlement.6 3
In considering the impact of government lawsuits on future mass
tort litigation, we must take account of the role of private lawyers in the
government suits. In the tobacco litigation, most of the states retained
private lawyers on contingent fees to handle the litigation, rather than
relying on lawyers within their own attorney general offices.64 In fact,
many of the lawyers retained by the states had been members of the
Castano class action group. 65 Similar contingent fee arrangements were
used to hire private lawyers in government actions against lead paint and
gun makers. 66 New Orleans Mayor Marc Morial's explanation for hiring
52See Joan Biskupic, Jurors Vent Outrage at Industry, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1999, at
Al.
59 See W. Kip Viscusi, A Postmortem on the Cigarette Settlement, 29 CUMB. L. REv.
523, 543-44 (1999).
60 See Brian J. Siebel, City Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Roadmap for
Reforming Gun Industry Misconduct, 18 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 247 (1999).
61 See State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226, 2001 WL 345830 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 2,
2001).
62 See Dagan & White, supra note 49, at 354; Viscusi, supra note 59, at 544.
63 See Cupp, supra note 52, at 687.
64 See Glenn G. Lanmi, States Face Many Pitfalls When Hiring Contingent Fee
Lawyers, ANDREWS TOBACCO INDUS. LITIG. REP., Mar. 14, 1997, at 16,218.
65 See Barker, supra note 14, at 108-13, 116.
66 See Barry Meier & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., States' Big Suits Against Industry Bring
Battle on Contingent Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1999, at A1; Bob Van Voris, Gun Cases
Use Tobacco Know-How, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 7, 1998, at Al.
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top plaintiffs' lawyers for the city's handgun lawsuit is telling: "You want
lawyers who can take on giants.
Had the government plaintiffs been unable to retain top lawyers on
contingent fees, it is quite possible that they would never have filed their
recoupment lawsuits, much less won sizable settlements. As long as
attorneys general and other government actors can use contingent fee
lawyers to pursue recoupment actions, they will want to do so. Such
arrangements allow government actors to raise revenue and right wrongs
without expending the resources of their offices. Contingent fee
arrangements by government plaintiffs, however, raise serious policy
concerns. 68 First, they give government legal authority to persons with a
direct financial stake in a matter, which can skew the incentives for the
government's lawyers.69  Second, they allow government entities to
pursue litigation without the usual checks and balances provided by
legislative control over purse-strings. 70  If state legislatures respond to
these concerns by restricting or prohibiting government retention of
contingent fee lawyers, 71 then the role of government lawsuits in mass tort
litigation may diminish considerably.
VI. CLASS ACTIONS
In recent mass tort litigation, defendants have sometimes sought to
use class actions as a tool for achieving global resolutions, particularly
through settlement class actions.72 Generally, however, class actions
remain a tool for plaintiffs. To the extent class actions can be used for
mass tort litigation, they aggregate power on the plaintiffs' side and tend
to cut away at defendants' litigation advantage.
Mass, tort class actions got off to a rocky start. The Advisory
Committee Notes to the 1966 federal class action rule stated:
67 Van Voris, supra note 66, at Al 5.
68 See Erichson, supra note 48, at 35-40.
69 See id. at 36-38.
70 See id. at 38-39.
71 See Cupp, supra note 52, at 698 (suggesting, as an appropriate legislative response, the
elimination of contingent fees for government lawsuits).
72 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). As Professor
Richard Nagareda explains, the 1990s "saw a rethinking of the class action as not so
much a procedural device for actual trial of similar claims but primarily as the means by
which to bind class members to a resolution of their claims negotiated out of court."
Richard A. Nagareda, Punitive Damage Class Actions and the Baseline of Tort, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 943, 944 (2001).
136 [Vol. 26:123
THE END OF THE DEFENDANT ADVANTAGE
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons
is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of
the likelihood that significant questions, not only of
damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would be
present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In
these circumstances, an action conducted nominally as a
class action would degenerate in practice into multiple
lawsuits separately tried.73
Numerous courts cited the Advisory Committee Note in rejecting class
actions for not only "mass accidents" such as air crashes and hotel fires,
but also for mass toxic torts. Then, in the 1980s and early 1990s, district
courts began to certify some mass tort class actions, only to be reversed by
a string of appellate decisions decertifying the class actions, often with
strong language suggesting skepticism about the viability of mass tort
class actions. These decisions were handed down by a number of federal
courts of appeals in mass tort cases involving tobacco,74 penile implants,75
pick-up trucks,76 and blood products,77 as well as by the U.S. Supreme
Court in two asbestos settlement class actions, Amchem Products v.
Windsor78 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corporation.
79
Plaintiffs' lawyers responded to these federal appellate class
decertifications primarily by turning their attention to the state courts. As
Professor Mark Weber points out, until recently the federal courts were
viewed as the natural forum for mass tort class actions, both because
multidistrict litigation ("MDL") transfer 80 facilitates consolidated handling
of cases, and because federal courts seemed a more sensible forum for
thorough nationwide resolution of mass tort claims.8' However, the
Supreme Court's recent decisions on both Rule 23 and MDL have made
73 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note (1966).
74 Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
75 In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996).
76 In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768
3d Cir. 1995).
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
78 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
79527 U.S. 815 (1999).
80 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2001).
81 See Mark C. Weber, Forum Allocation in Toxic Tort Cases: Lessons from the Tobacco
Litigation and Other Recent Developments, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
93, 95 (2001).
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federal courts less viable as forums for resolving mass torts on a
widespread basis.8 2
While federal courts have become less attractive for mass tort
resolution, and the federal appellate courts in particular appear hostile to
mass tort class actions, some state courts have been more hospitable.
After the Castano nationwide tobacco class action was decertified by the
federal court of appeals, the plaintiffs' lawyers changed tack and pursued a
number of statewide class actions, some of them in state courts.8 3 Most
federal and state courts have refused to certify tobacco class actions,8 4 but
some state courts have allowed them to proceed. The Engle class action,
with its historic $145 billion punitive damage verdict, was in Florida state
court,8 5 as was the Broin flight attendants second-hand smoke class
action.86 A cigarette class action has gone forward in Louisiana state
court, as well.87 In a West Virginia state court, a medical monitoring class
action proceeded to trial, although it resulted in a mistrial.88 Professor
Weber notes that "the Florida tobacco litigation should increase the
momentum stateward, and legislation is not likely to change that
condition, at least with regard to dispersed product injuries."89 Although
82 See id. at 95-98. Professor Weber explains that Amchem Products v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591 (1997) reduces the attractiveness of federal courts for achieving nationwide
class resolution of mass tort claims; that Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999)
reduces the appeal of federal courts for non-opt-out class actions; and that Lexecon v.
Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998), reduces the usefulness of
federal MDL as a mechanism for resolving widespread claims.
83 See, e.g., Scott v. American Tobacco Co., 725 So. 2d 10 (La. Ct. App. 1998); Philip
Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200 (Md. 2000). See generally Claudia MacLachlan,
New Tobacco Class Actions Gearing Up, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 1996, at B 1 (reporting on
rost-Castano state court tobacco class actions).
See, e.g., Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1998); Castano v.
American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); Chamberlain v. American Tobacco
Co., 70 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Ohio 1999); Thompson v. American Tobacco Co., 189
F.R.D. 544 (D. Minn. 1999); Clay v. American Tobacco Co., 188 F.R.D. 483 (S.D. Il1.
1999); Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200; Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 720 N.E.2d 892 (N.Y.
1999); Geiger v. American Tobacco Co., 696 N.Y.S.2d 345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999), affid,
716 N.Y.S.2d 108 (App. Div. 2000).
85 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
86 Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
87 Scott, 725 So. 2d 10.
88See Judge Declares Mistrial in Tobacco Class Action, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2001, at
A4.
89 Weber, supra note 81, at 101. Professor Weber goes on to argue that the shift of mass
tort litigation from federal to state court is a good thing. See id. at 100-03.
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some states have recently given class actions a cooler reception,9" it
appears that mass tort class actions have met with greater success in state
court than in federal court.
In addition to learning to avoid federal court, tobacco plaintiffs'
lawyers have learned to define classes more narrowly. Unlike the Castano
effort, which sought certification of a class including essentially all
nicotine-addicted persons in the United States,9' more recent class actions
have been defined on a statewide basis, or have been defined more
narrowly in other ways, such as the class of flight attendants exposed to
second-hand smoke. 9  Interestingly, in the Engle class action in Florida,
the plaintiffs initially sought certification of a nationwide class of
smokers, but the appellate court on interlocutory appeal narrowed the class
to include only Florida plaintiffs. 93
There is one type of class action that, rather than empowering
plaintiffs, tends to give defendants greater negotiating leverage. That is
the settlement class action, in which a class settlement is negotiated prior
to the motion for class certification, and plaintiffs and defendants then
jointly seek class certification conditioned on the settlement. The
potential problems of settlement class actions have been discussed at
length elsewhere. 94 It suffices to repeat here that in a settlement class
action, plaintiffs lose a significant piece of the bargaining leverage they
would have in a class action certified for purposes of litigation.
Significantly, the settlement class action is the type of class action most
emphatically discouraged by the Supreme Court's decisions in Amchem 95
and Ortiz.96 Thus, to the extent class actions serve to empower plaintiffs,
they are continuing, albeit with narrower class definitions and decidedly
mixed success. But to the extent class actions could reinvigorate the
defendant advantage, they have been sharply restricted. This is not to say
that mass tort settlement class actions have disappeared. The Supreme
90 See Linda S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship: Is There Smoother
Sailing for Class Actions in Gulf Waters?, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1709, 1718 (2000).
91 See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
92 Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
93R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
94See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 COLUM. L. REv. 1343 (1995); Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and
Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEo. L.J. 1983, 1995-2005 (1999); Susan Koniak, Feasting
While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045
1995).Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
96Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
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Court left the door open for such settlements under the right
circumstances.97 As evidenced by the recent settlement class action in the
diet drugs litigation, however, the newer brand of settlement class action
appears to include greater protections of class members' interests than did
the settlements in Amchem, Ortiz, and earlier cases.
98
CONCLUSION
While each mass tort litigation has its own properties, they are not
so different as to make it impossible to spot trends in the way the litigation
is handled by the lawyers. Thus, while the tobacco litigation is a rather
extraordinary story by virtue of its magnitude and the rapidity of its
momentum shift, that story helps us get a clearer picture of how future
mass torts are likely to be approached. It is a story that bodes well for
plaintiffs.
In the future, as in the past, defendants facing emerging mass tort
litigation will hire prominent lead counsel, as well as local counsel, and
will devote substantial resources to the defense. As always, mass tort
defendants will strive for a coherent strategy based on thorough
information-gathering. But instead of facing individual plaintiffs and
counsel with limited budgets and no strategic organization, mass tort
defendants will face something quite different. They will face well-
established, well-fimded plaintiffs' lawyers playing leading roles in the
litigation, willing to invest substantial resources to pursue the plaintiffs'
claims. They will face an organized plaintiffs' bar, in the form of ATLA
litigation groups and other coalitions, able to share information, coordinate
strategy, and in some instances pool resources. Sometimes, they will face
state attorneys general or other government actors pursuing recoupment
claims based on defendants' tortious conduct, and some of those
government entities may be represented by leading private lawyers on
contingent fees. The defendants will see class actions filed, and some of
those class actions will likely be certified, especially statewide class
actions in state courts.
If this accurately describes what defendants are likely to face in the
post-tobacco world of mass tort litigation, is there a systematic advantage
for defendants? Is it David-and-Goliath litigation? It seems to me that
97 See Erichson, supra note 94, at 1995-2005.
98 See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 28, 2000) (certifying and approving nationwide settlement class action); see also
Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and "Put" Options in the Mass Tort Class
Action, 115 HARV. L. REv. 747 (2002).
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these developments wipe out nearly all of the advantage large corporate
defendants formerly had over plaintiffs in mass tort litigation. This brings
us back to the idea of dividing mass tort litigation into pre-tobacco and
post-tobacco eras. For pre-tobacco mass tort litigation, it seems plausible
to think in terms of David and Goliath, or a systematic defendant
advantage. For post-tobacco mass tort litigation, the playing field appears
more level. Goliath has not shrunk, but David has grown.
I see this mostly as a healthy development. I take it as axiomatic
that in an adversary system of dispute resolution, a level playing field is
better than a tilted one. That is not to say that the end of the defendant
advantage has no downside. First, as plaintiffs' lawyers acquire greater
resources, there is a risk of over-investment. In other words, plaintiffs'
lawyers looking to invest fees in the next mass tort litigation may pursue
claims that are less well-founded than claims they would pursue with
scarcer resources. Thus, the end of the defendant advantage in mass tort
litigation naturally leads to an increase in the filing of mass tort claims.
An increase in litigation imposes costs in lawyers' fees and expenses as
well as the public costs of the court system. It also increases the
likelihood that non-meritorious claims will be asserted, or that defendants
will feel compelled to settle despite valid legal defenses. 99 Second, as the
plaintiffs' bar becomes more powerful, its role in public policy issues-
including, for example, the issue of who should bear the public health
costs of smoking-becomes greater. Some commentators have expressed
the concern that litigation is not an effective or appropriate way to make
broad public policy. 10 These are legitimate concerns, worthy of attention.
It does not seem to me, however, that these concerns are appropriately
addressed by maintaining a dispute resolution system in which plaintiffs
are systematically disadvantaged based on a power imbalance.
The end of the systematic defendant advantage does not mean that
plaintiffs will necessarily prevail in the litigation. In any given mass tort
litigation, it remains perfectly plausible that defendants will win on the
law or facts, or in the dynamics of litigation and negotiation. Defendants
99 This argument has been advanced on the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal,
which has described a "tilting of the system to favor the plaintiffs," and argued that
"[s]omething has gone seriously wrong when defendants with solid, legally compelling
arguments no longer feel safe taking their chances in a courtroor." Editorial, The
Lawyer Issue, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2000, at A36.
100 See, e.g., Robert A. Levy, Turning Lead Into Gold, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 23, 1999, at
21; Cohen, supra note 28, at 22. But see Robert B. Reich, Regulation Is Out, Litigation Is
In, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 1999, at 15A (arguing that when legislatures and regulatory
agencies fail to protect the public interest, "perhaps regulating through lawsuits is better
than not regulating at all").
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may still have advantages over plaintiffs as a matter of tort law or
evidence law.' 0' Indeed, as tort plaintiffs enjoy greater litigation success,
the law of torts, procedure, or evidence may shift in favor of defendants,
just as an earlier wave of tort reform followed a perception that tort
plaintiffs had become too successful. The Wall Street Journal, for
example, recently editorialized in favor of tort reform legislation as a
response to the growing power of the "impresarios of the plaintiffs bar."'
10 2
In individual tort litigation, as opposed to mass torts, defendants
retain many advantages over plaintiffs. 103 The developments addressed in
this Article simply do not apply to tort cases in which the stakes are
insufficient to justify heavy investment, and in which the number of
plaintiffs is too low to produce coordinated strategy, government
involvement, or class certification. Without the benefit of the substantial
investment and coordination that plaintiffs' lawyers bring to modem mass
tort litigation, tort plaintiffs in individual cases may face a daunting
challenge litigating against defendants with greater resources and
information.
Nor does the end of the systematic defendant advantage mean that
all is well in the world of mass tort litigation. There is plenty of reason to
remainpessimistic about finding ways to resolve mass torts efficiently and
justly. 1°4 But it does mean that mass tort defendants are less likely to
101 Several commentators have observed that the standard for admissibility of expert
testimony enunciated by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), gives defendants an advantage over plaintiffs in civil litigation.
See Ned Miltenberg, Out of the Fire and into the Fryeing Pan or Back to the Future,
TRIAL, Mar. 2001, at 19 ("[T]he Daubert-Joiner-Kumho trilogy has had a devastating
effect on civil plaintiffs, at least in federal courts and in those states that have fully
adopted Daubert."); D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal
Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 110 (2000)
(reporting empirical finding that in civil cases, "nearly two-thirds of challenged plaintiff
expertise [is] rejected, whereas in the small number of cases where plaintiffs have
challenged defense-proffered expertise, less than half the defense proffers have been
rejected").
102 Editorial, Lawyers Torch the Economy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2001, at A14. See also
Levy, supra note 100, at 21 (arguing in favor of a loser-pays rule for government lawsuits
and other reform proposals in response to the success of the attorney general tobacco
suits).
103 As Professor Richard Cupp puts it, "the torts landscape presents a picture
comparatively favorable to defendants in most respects, but featuring truly enormous
s3ikes in select mass tort claims." Cupp, supra note 52, at 687.
For commentary on the pessimism that pervades academic discussion of mass tort
litigation, see Stephen B. Burbank, Foreword: Causes and Limits of Pessimism, 148 U.
PA. L. REv. 1851 (2000).
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prevail out of the sheer litigation advantage that comes from superior
resources, information and organization. It means that plaintiffs are less
likely to abandon their claims as casualties of a war of attrition. To that
extent, the end of the systematic defendant advantage strikes me as good
news.
